

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~TOP SECRET~~
PERIODIC INTELLIGENCE REPORT ON
SOVIET INTENTIONS AND ACTIVITIES

~~TOP SECRET~~

JCS Declassification/Release Instructions on File

From: 27 July 1950
To : 2 August 1950
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2
Department of the Army
Washington 25, D.C.
3 August 1950

No. 5

1. U.S.S.R. SITUATION AT END OF PERIOD

- a. The Soviet Union is in the advanced stages of preparation for war and could initiate offensive operations with no additional warning. Reliable intelligence on Soviet intentions to go to war in the near future is lacking.
- b. Chinese Communist troop movement suggests new deployments toward Manchuria. There is no reliable information that an attack on Taiwan is imminent.
- c. Recent indications point to a continuation of Soviet preparedness measures, especially logistical and construction activity in Southeast Europe.

2. SOVIET-COMMUNIST OPERATIONS DURING PERIOD

- a. Summary.—In China, elements of the Fourth Field Army have moved northward through Hankow indicating probable deployment to Manchuria. There are no reliable indications that an attack on Taiwan is imminent. Viet Minh capabilities and preparations are increasing. Airfield and other military construction in Hungary may be planned for completion by 1 September 1950.
- b. Operations of enemy component elements.
 - (1) KOREA.—See current situation reports. Movement of elements of the Chinese Communist Fourth Field Army northward from Hankow suggests deployment to Manchuria where they could be available for use in Korea.
 - (2) CHINA.—There are no reports of a further buildup of troops for an attack on Taiwan and reconnaissance has failed to reveal significant concentrations of junks or other small craft on the Fukien coast.

Document No. 6

No Change in Class. ☐

☐ Declassified

Class. Changed to: TS. S

Next Review Date: 1989

Form: JIR 70-3

Date: 27 FEB 1979

Approved For Release 2002/08/21 : CIA-RDP91T01172R000400200005-2

25X1

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~TOP SECRET~~

00000000

54000051

737

- (3) **INDO-CHINA.**—Recent reports indicate extensive training of Viet Minh troops in China and other preparations apparently for a renewed offensive, probably in the fall. Limited operations in preparation for an offensive may occur in the near future.
 - (4) **SOUTHEAST EUROPE.**—Progress on airfield and communications construction in Hungary suggests possible completion of these projects by 1 September 1950. Large-scale construction is under way at one airfield in Czechoslovakia. There are unconfirmed but possibly true reports of large shipments of materiel into Rumania and of the arrival of additional Soviet troops. Increased air defense measures are reported in Bulgaria.
3. See Tab "A", attached.
4. **SOVIET CAPABILITIES.**—Available reserves for operations in Korea would be increased by the deployment of Chinese Communist forces to Manchuria. Communist capabilities for an offensive in Indo-China are increasing. Construction activity in Southeast Europe and a possible buildup in Rumania are increasing the Soviet-Satellite potential for sudden military action.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~TOP SECRET~~

CONFIDENTIAL

Approved For Release 2002/08/21 : CIA-RDP91T01172R000400200005-2

TOP SECRET

TAB "A"

ESTIMATE OF SOVIET INTENTIONS TO GO TO WAR IN THE IMMEDIATE FUTURE

Proceedings of the IIF Steering Committee, 2 August 1950

1. Soviet Intentions in the Far East.

a. A reliable report, [] states that troops of the Chinese Communist Fourth Field Army had arrived in Hankow during the preceding four days and continued north by rail with minimum delay. The numbers of troops appeared to be large and the through railway to the north was closed to cargo and passenger traffic. This is the first reliable information of the movement of a sizeable number of Fourth Field Army troops northward from Hankow, although there have been numerous previous rumors that troops of this Army were being transferred to Manchuria. The movement through Hankow is reported to involve only elements of the Fourth Field Army and does not necessarily indicate movement of the entire Fourth Field Army northward. Evidence is lacking that these troops have moved out of the Central China Military area, commanded by Lin Piao, which extends northward from Hankow to the Yellow River. The movement suggests, however, that the troops are destined for Manchuria.

25X1

b. There have been no reports of a further buildup of troops in the Fukien area for an attack on Taiwan. One report states that there was a reduction of troops in the Amoy area during the last two weeks of June and that it was rumored that these troops had gone to Manchuria. This is the first indication of a possible movement of elements of the Third Field Army out of the Fukien area, but there have been no other reports of such movement and any material reduction of forces in the Fukien area is considered doubtful. Reconnaissance has failed to reveal evidence of a massing of junks or other craft in the ports opposite Taiwan and there have been no reliable reports of such concentrations. There have been indications of the chartering of ships by the Chinese Communists which would materially increase their capabilities for an assault on Taiwan, however, and, as previously stated, failure to observe junk concentrations does not necessarily preclude a buildup of boats in the coastal area.

c. The Soviet representative at the recent Communist meeting in Berlin is reported to have defined Soviet intentions in the Far East as follows: The U.S.S.R. considers the total and rapid victory of the North Korean forces to be essential to the accomplishment of Soviet diplomatic objectives in the Far East. These objectives include the establishment of an all-Korean government, which will be recognized by the countries of the Soviet bloc, and a campaign for the admission of

CONFIDENTIAL
TOP SECRET

Approved For Release 2002/08/21 : CIA-RDP91T01172R000400200005-2

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~TOP SECRET~~

Korea and Communist China to the U.N. Communist propaganda must emphasize the right of the Mao government to liberate Taiwan and must create in Europe a psychosis of "non-intervention" in Asiatic affairs. The U.S.S.R. hopes to achieve these objectives in Asia without precipitating world-wide conflict.

d. In Indo-China, the capabilities of the Viet Minh are increasing. Recent reports indicate that: (1) extensive training of Viet Minh troops in Chinese territory has been in progress, probably since April; (2) Chinese Communist arms deliveries into Tonkin may have been on a larger scale than hitherto reported; (3) a small number of Soviet technicians and advisers are present in South China and on Hainan, whose duties may include technical advice to the Viet Minh and supervision of Viet Minh-Chinese preparations for an offensive in Indo-China; and (4) Viet Minh preparations for an offensive in the fall are better advanced than had been previously estimated. Such an offensive might include overt Chinese Communist participation and the Chinese Communists are considered to have the capability of invading Indo-China with an initial force of 150,000. Chinese participation, however, is considered more likely to take the form of clandestine assistance, including possible infiltration and integration of Chinese Communist troops or even whole units into the Viet Minh forces, as well as the continuation of aid in the form of war materiel, advisers and training facilities. Current Viet Minh concentrations in Tonkin and Cochin China indicate that the Viet Minh may be about to undertake certain limited operations designed to improve their military positions while preparations for a general offensive are in progress. The most probable immediate operation is an attack in force on Laokay in an attempt to free the northwestern frontier of Tonkin of French control.

e. There have been no reports indicating imminent Chinese Communist action against Tibet, Burma or Hong Kong.

f. From the foregoing, it is concluded that:

(1) There are indications that elements of the Chinese Communist Fourth Field Army are being returned to Manchuria. These forces, which are among the best in the Chinese Communist armies, could be available for use in Korea.

(2) There are no reliable indications that an attack on Taiwan is imminent.

(3) Viet Minh capabilities are increasing and preparations appear to be under way for a general offensive, probably in the fall.

(4) There is no new evidence of a Soviet intent to employ their own forces in overt military operations in the Far East.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~TOP SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~~~TOP SECRET~~

2. Soviet Intentions in Europe and the Near East.

a. There have been several indications in Germany of Soviet intentions to conduct larger scale maneuvers than last year and to start large-scale maneuvers earlier. A recent report states that political indoctrination of Soviet troops in Germany has been intensified with emphasis on preparing the troops psychologically for war.

b. A high level military conference was held in Czechoslovakia last week, attended by over 200 Czech officers, a dozen Soviet officers and military representatives of the other Eastern European Satellites. This conference, following shortly after the arrival of Col. Gen. Gusev, the new Soviet Military Attache to Prague, supports other indications that Czech military plans are being speeded up.

c. In Hungary, reliable observations of the progress of construction on five airfields suggest that this construction may be completed between 15 August and 1 September 1950. An underground communications center in Budapest may also be completed about the same time, and reliable reports state that another communications center is being constructed in Northeast Hungary near Miskolc. There are unconfirmed reports of the construction of underground facilities for ammunition storage at numerous locations in Hungary, and previous reliable observation has indicated underground construction of gasoline depots at airfields in Hungary. In Czechoslovakia, large scale construction is reported at the Zatec airfield (northwest of Prague) with indications of excavations for underground facilities. Progress on construction of a strategic road in southwestern Czechoslovakia is also reported.

d. There are unconfirmed rumors that Hungarian and Soviet troops in Hungary expect to enter war operations directly from present summer maneuvers during the first week of September. Although these rumors may be planted, the construction work noted above may presage a buildup in Hungary in September. At present, observation continues to indicate no unusual military activity in Hungary nor any movement of Soviet or Hungarian forces towards the Yugoslav border. There are unconfirmed reports, however, that the Soviets may have assumed control of the restricted area on the southern Hungarian border.

e. There have been a number of recent reports of low reliability indicating the arrival of additional Soviet troops in Rumania and the shipments of large amounts of materiel from the U.S.S.R., with movements of this equipment reported both southward towards Bulgaria and westward towards the Yugoslav border. Shipments during July are alleged to have included a considerable number of Soviet tanks and extensive shipments of gasoline through Bucharest towards the Bulgarian border. The extremely tight security in Rumania has precluded Western observations and the reliability of these reports cannot be assessed.

-3-

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~~~TOP SECRET~~

CONFIDENTIAL

Approved For Release 2002/08/21 : CIA-RDP91T01172R000400200005-2

~~**TOP SECRET**~~

In general, there is better evidence of the movement of materiel into Rumania than of a large buildup of Soviet forces, but some increase in Soviet troop strength cannot be discounted.

f. There are reports of increased air defense measures in Bulgaria, including the registration of children in preparation for evacuation; air raid precautions in large buildings in Sofia; and the probable movement of at least a portion of the War Ministry out of Sofia. There continue to be no firm indications of large Bulgarian concentrations on the Yugoslav, Greek or Turkish borders.

g. The Greek General Staff has reported that additional guerrillas are returning to Albania.

h. Soviet propaganda villifying Iran and alleging "American aggressive intentions" there again appears to have been accelerated. The clandestine Azerbaijan radio has called on the Kurds to develop their underground organizations in Iran and Iraq and has stated that "if and when the Soviet Army enters Iran the people of Kurdistan will rise and fight." The Iranians have not indicated undue concern over recent reports of Soviet troop movement on their border.

i. From the above, it is concluded that:

(1) There is no conclusive evidence of imminent hostilities against Western Europe, the Balkans or the Near East.

(2) There are continuing indications of preparations for such action and there have been indications in both Germany and South-eastern Europe of certain military construction activities to be completed by the autumn of 1950.

(3) An attack in any of these areas could occur without additional warning.

3. Other Indications of Soviet Intentions.

a. The previous report of large shipments of mercury from Spain to Israel, for probable trans-shipment to the U.S.S.R., has not been confirmed, but there have been several reports in recent months of Soviet efforts to procure mercury through various intermediaries in Europe.

b. There is no additional evidence of general Communist sabotage. Communist preparations for such action in Western Europe, however, are indicated by a report that the French, Belgian and Italian Communist Parties have been instructed to form more cadres in order to halt war manufacture and the unloading and transport of war materiel

CONFIDENTIAL

~~**TOP SECRET**~~

CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2002/08/21 : CIA-RDP91T01172R000400200005-2
~~TOP SECRET~~

"when the time arrives." The German Communist meeting in Berlin (20-24 July) showed an unusually aggressive temper and included the announcement of a policy of organized resistance to the occupation authorities in Western Germany.

CONFIDENTIAL
~~TOP SECRET~~